

Restriction Access, Population Recovery & Partial Identification

Avi Wigderson
IAS, Princeton








Joint with

Zeev Dvir
Anup Rao
Amir Yehudayoff

Restriction Access,

A new model of “Grey-box” access

Systems, Models, Observations



$$R_{\text{total}} = R_1 // [(R_3 // R_4) + R_2] // (R_5 + R_5)$$

From Input-Output $(I_1, O_1), (I_2, O_2), (I_3, O_3), \dots?$
Typically more!

Black-box access

Successes & Limits

Learning: PAC, membership, statistical...queries

Decision trees, DNFs?

Cryptography: semantic, CPA, CCA, ... security

Cold boot, microwave,... attacks?

Optimization: Membership, separation,... oracles

Strongly polynomial algorithms?

Pseudorandomness: Hardness vs. Randomness

Derandomizing specific algorithms?

Complexity: $\Sigma^2 = \text{NP}^{\text{NP}}$

What problems can we solve if $P=\text{NP}$?

The gray scale of access

$$f: \Sigma^n \rightarrow \Sigma^m$$

D: “device” computing f
(from a family of devices)


Black Box

How to model?
Many specific ideas.
Ours: general, clean




Gray Box

- natural starting point
- natural intermediate pt

Clear Box




$x_1, f(x_1)$
 $x_2, f(x_2)$
 $x_3, f(x_3)$
....



Restriction Access (RA)

$$f: \Sigma^n \rightarrow \Sigma^m$$

D : “device” computing f



Restriction: $\rho = (x, L)$, $L \subseteq [n]$, $x \in \Sigma^n$, L
 L live vars

Observations: $(\rho, D | \rho)$

$D | \rho$ (simplified after fixing) computes $f | \rho$ on L

Black $L = \emptyset$

Gray

Clear $L = [n]$


$(x, f(x))$

$(\rho, D | \rho)$

(x, D)


Example: Decision Tree

D



$$\rho = (x, L)$$
$$L = \{3, 4\}$$
$$x = (1010)$$

$$D|_{\rho} =$$



Modeling choices (RA-PAC)

Restriction: $\rho = (x, L)$, $L \subseteq [n]$, $x \in \Sigma^n$, unknown D

Input

x : friendly, adversarial, random

Unknown distribution (as in PAC)

Live vars

L : friendly, adversarial, random

μ -independent dist (as in random restrictions)

RA-PAC Results

Positive -
In contrast
to PAC !!!

Probably, Approximately Correct (PAC) learning of D , from restrictions with each variable remains alive with prob μ

Thm 1[DRWY]: A poly(s, μ) alg for RA-PAC learning size- s decision trees, for every $\mu > 0$
(reconstruction from pairs of live variables)

Thm 2[DRWY]: A poly(s, μ) alg for RA-PAC learning size- s DNFs, for every $\mu > .365...$
(reduction to "Population Recovery Problem")

Population Recovery

(learning a mixture of binomials)


Population Recovery Problem

k species, n attributes, from Σ ,

Vectors $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k \in \Sigma^n$

Distribution p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k

$\mu, \epsilon > 0$



Red: Known
Blue: Unknown

Task: Recover all v_i, p_i (upto ϵ) from
samples

Population Recovery Problem

k species, n attributes, from Σ , $\mu, \epsilon > 0$

$v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k \in \Sigma^n$

p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k fraction in population

p_1	1/2	0000	v_1
p_2	1/3	0110	v_2
p_3	1/6	1100	v_3

Task: Recover all v_i, p_i (upto ϵ) from samples

Samplers:

(1) $u \leftarrow v_i$ with prob. p_i

0110

μ -Lossy Sampler:

(2) $u(j) \leftarrow ?$ with prob. $1-\mu \quad \forall j \in [n]$

?1?0

μ -Noisy Sampler:

(2) $u(j)$ flipped w.p. $1/2-\mu \quad \forall j \in [n]$

1100

Loss - Paleontology

Skull
Teeth
Vertebrae
Arms
Ribs
Legs
Tail

26%



11%



13%




30%



20%



True Data



Loss - Paleontology

From samples

Skull
Teeth
Vertebrae
Arms
Ribs
Legs
Tail

Dig #1



Dig #2



Dig #3



Dig #4 each finding common to many species!

How do they do it?

Noise - Privacy

	Socialism	Abortion	Gay marriage	Marijuana	Male	Rich	North US
2%	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
1%	1	1	0	0	0	1	1

.....
..... True Data

From samples

Joe	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Jane	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

....Who flipped every correct answer with probability 49%

Deniability? Recovery?

PRP - applications

Recovering from loss & noise

- Clustering / Learning / Data mining
- Computational biology / Archeology /
- Error correction
- Database privacy
-

Numerous related papers & books

PRP - Results

Facts: $\mu=0$ obliterates all information.

- No polytime algorithm for $\mu = o(1)$

Thm 3 [DRWY] A $\text{poly}(k, n, \epsilon)$ algorithm, from **lossy** samples, for every $\mu > .365\dots$

Thm 4 [WY]: A $\text{poly}(k^{\log k}, n, \epsilon)$ algorithm, from **lossy** and/or **noisy** samples, for every $\mu > 0$


Kearns, Mansour, Ron, Rubinfeld, Schapire, Sellie
 $\exp(k)$ algorithm for this discrete version

Moitra, Valiant

$\exp(k)$ algorithm for Gaussian version
(even when noise is unknown)

Proof of Thm 4

Reconstruct $\mathbf{v}_i, \mathbf{p}_i$



From samples ?1?0, 0??0, 1100,

Lemma 1: Can assume we know the \mathbf{v}_i 's!

Proof: Exposing one column at a time. ■

Lemma 2: Easy in $\exp(n)$ time!

Proof: *Lossy* - enough samples without “?”

Noisy - linear algebra on sample probabilities.

Idea: Make $n = O(\log k)$ [Dimension Reduction]

Partial IDs

a new dimension-reduction technique

Dimension Reduction and small IDs

$n = 8$

$k = 9$

u - random sample

$q_i = \Pr[u[S_i]=v_i[S_i]]$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
p_1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	v_1
p_2	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	v_2
p_3	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	v_3
p_4	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	v_4
p_5	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	v_5
p_6	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	v_6
p_7	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	v_7
p_8	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	v_8
p_9	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	v_9

IDs

$S_1 = \{1, 2\}$

$S_2 = \{8\}$

$S_3 = \{1, 5, 6\}$

Lemma: Can approximate p_i in $\exp(|S_i|)$ time !

Does one always have small IDs?

Small IDs ?

$$n = 8$$

$$k = 9$$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
p_1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	v_1
p_2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	v_2
p_3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	v_3
p_4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	v_4
p_5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	v_5
p_6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	v_6
p_7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	v_7
p_8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	v_8
p_9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	v_9

IDs

$$S_1 = \{1\}$$

$$S_2 = \{2\}$$

$$S_3 = \{3\}$$

...

$$S_8 = \{8\}$$

$$S_9 = \{1, 2, \dots, 8\}$$

NO!

However, ...

Linear algebra & Partial IDs

$$n = 8$$

$$k = 9$$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		PIDs
p_1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	v_1	$S_1 = \{1\}$
p_2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	v_2	$S_2 = \{2\}$
p_3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	v_3	$S_3 = \{3\}$
p_4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	v_4	...
p_5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	v_5	
p_6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	v_6	
p_7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	v_7	
p_8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	v_8	$S_8 = \{8\}$
p_9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	v_9	$S_9 = \emptyset$

However, we can compute $p_9 = 1 - p_1 - p_2 - \dots - p_8$

Back substitution and **Imposters**

$$q_1 = p_1$$

$$q_2 = p_2$$

$$q_3 = p_3$$

$$q_4 = p_1 + p_2 = p_4$$

$$p_5$$

$$p_6$$

$$p_7$$

$$p_8$$

$$p_9$$

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1

0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0

0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1

1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1

0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1

1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1

v_1

v_2

v_3

v_4

v_5

v_6

v_7

v_8

v_9

PIDs

$$S_1 = \{1, 2\}$$

$$S_2 = \{8\}$$

$$S_3 = \{1, 5, 6\}$$

$$S_4 = \{3\}$$

any subset

Can use back substitution if no cycles !

Are there always acyclic small *partial* IDs?

Acyclic small *partial* IDs exist

$n = 8$
 $k = 9$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	PIDs
p_1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	v_1
p_2	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	v_2
p_3	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	v_3
p_4	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	v_4
p_5	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	v_5
p_6	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	v_6
p_7	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	v_7
p_8	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	v_8
p_9	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	v_9

$S_8 = \{1, 5, 6\}$

Lemma: There is always an **ID** of length $\log k$

Idea: Remove and iterate to find more **PIDs**

Lemma: Acyclic $(\log k)$ -**PIDs** always exists!

Chains of small Partial IDs

$n = 8$
 $k = 6$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		PIDs
p_1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	v_1	$S_1 = \{1\}$
p_2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	v_2	$S_2 = \{2\}$
p_3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	v_3	$S_3 = \{3\}$
p_4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	v_4	...
p_5	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	v_5	
p_6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	v_6	$S_6 = \{6\}$

Compute: $q_i = \Pr[u_i = 1] = \sum_{j \leq i} p_j$ from sample u

Back substitution: $p_i = q_i - \sum_{j < i} p_j$


Problem: Long chains! Error doubles each step, so is exponential in the chain length.

Want: Short chains!

The PID (imposter) graph

Given: $V=(v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k) \in \Sigma^n$ $S=(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k) \subseteq [n]^n$

Construct $G(V;S)$ by connecting $v_j \rightarrow v_i$ iff v_i is an imposter of v_j : $v_i[S_j] = v_j[S_j]$



PIDs

$$S_1 = \{1\}$$

$$S_2 = \{2\}$$

$$S_3 = \{3\}$$

$$\dots$$

$$S_5 = \{5\}$$

width = $\max_i |S_i|$ **depth** = $\text{depth}(G)$

Want: PIDs w/small **width** and **depth** for all V

Constructing cheap PID graphs

Theorem: For every $V=(v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k)$, $v_i \in \Sigma^n$ we can efficiently find **PIDs** $S=(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k)$, $S_i \subseteq [n]$ of **width** and **depth** at most $\log k$

Algorithm: Initialize $S_i = \emptyset$ for all i

Invariant: $|\text{imposters}(v_i; S_i)| \leq k/2^{|S_i|}$

Repeat: (1) Make S_i maximal

if not, add minority coordinates to S_i

(2) Make chains monotone:

$v_j \rightarrow v_i$ then $|S_j| < |S_i|$ (so G acyclic)

if not, set S_i to S_j (and apply (1) to S_i)

	1	2	3	4	
	0	0	1	0	v_1
	0	0	0	0	v_2
	0	0	0	1	v_3
	1	0	0	1	v_4
	1	1	1	0	v_5
	1	0	1	0	v_6

Analysis of the algorithm

Theorem: For every $V=(v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k) \in \Sigma^n$
we can efficiently find **PIDs** $S=(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k) \subseteq [n]^n$
of **width** and **depth** at most $\log k$

Algorithm: Initialize $S_i = \emptyset$ for all i

Invariant: $|\text{imposters}(v_i; S_i)| \leq k/2^{|S_i|}$

Repeat: (1) Make S_i maximal

(2) Make chains monotone ($v_j \rightarrow v_i$ then $|S_j| < |S_i|$)

Analysis:

- $|S_i| \leq \log k$ throughout for all i
- $\sum_i |S_i|$ increases each step
- Termination in $k \log k$ steps.
- **width** $\leq \log k$ and so **depth** $\leq \log k$

Conclusions

- **Restriction access**: a new, general model of “gray box” access (**largely unexplored!**)
- A general problem of **population recovery**
- Efficient reconstruction from loss & noise
- **Partial IDs**, a new dimension reduction technique for databases.

Open: polynomial time algorithm in k ?
(currently $k^{\log k}$, PIDs can't beat $k^{\log \log k}$)

Open: Handle unknown errors ?